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Central banks intervene in foreign exchange markets in order to achieve a variety of overall economic 
objectives, such as controlling inflation, maintaining competitiveness or maintaining financial stability. 
The precise objectives of policy and how they are reflected in foreign exchange market intervention 
depend on a number of factors, including the stage of a country’s development, the degree of financial 
market development and integration, and a country’s overall vulnerability to shocks. The precise 
definition of which operations in forex markets constitute “intervention” has also been a matter of 
controversy.
2 
Three immediate objectives of intervention have been important: to influence the level of the exchange 
rate; to dampen exchange rate volatility or supply liquidity to foreign exchange markets; and to 
influence the amount of foreign reserves. Much of the analysis in this paper draws on central bank 
responses to a questionnaire on foreign exchange market intervention and meetings with central bank 
officials and foreign exchange market participants.  
II.  Motives for intervention 
Table 1 proposes a taxonomy of intervention that will be used to organise the discussion. Foreign 
exchange market intervention is driven by broad macroeconomic objectives shown in the column 
headers: to control inflation or maintain internal balance; to maintain external balance and prevent 
resource misallocation or preserve competitiveness and boost growth; and to prevent or deal with 
disorderly markets or crises. To achieve these objectives, central banks might seek to target the level 
of the exchange rate, dampen exchange rate volatility or influence the amount of foreign reserves.  
The economic objectives of intervention will influence its targets, the indicators monitored and the 
tactics. For example, under a floating exchange rate regime, if the concern is with inflation, the 
estimated pass-through from exchange rate changes to inflation is relevant, and the behaviour of the 
nominal exchange rate will be monitored with a view to preventing sharp changes (ie dampening 
volatility). If external balance is the primary concern, the real exchange rate and the current account, 
and factors that may influence these variables, such as the terms of trade or capital flows, will be 
monitored. If the concern is with financial stability and crisis prevention, then market conditions (some 
cited in Rhee’s paper on Korea in this volume) can be highly informative, including: how fast the 
exchange rate changes; the size of exchange rate volatility; bid-ask spreads; transaction volumes; and 
the exposure of different market participants. Determinants of the nominal exchange rate, such as 
portfolio flows or forward market transactions, would also be closely watched. Tactics - and the 
approach to intervention (leaning against the wind, dampening overshooting, etc) - may be heavily 
influenced by these same market conditions or by other indicators. Over a longer time horizon, in 
gauging the appropriate level of reserves needed for purposes of intervention, an assessment of 
whether capital flows are temporary or permanent can be helpful. 
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2   This issue is reviewed in Annex 1. BIS Papers No 24  5
 
Table 1 
Taxonomy of foreign exchange market intervention 
 Macroeconomic  objectives 
  Control inflation  




Maintain financial stability 




A. Influence  the 
exchange rate level 
(pegs, bands, crawls, 
announced or 
unannounced)  X X  X 
B. Dampen  volatility 
under floating X  X  X 
i. Respond  to 
volatility symmetrically     X 
ii. Prevent  excessive 
movements or 
overshooting  
(no fixed target)  X X  X 
iii.  Resist too rapid 
movements  X X  X 
iv. Maintain  liquidity 
in foreign exchange 
markets    X 
C. Influence  the 
amount of  
foreign reserves     X 
 
In his paper on the Czech experience for this volume, Holub makes the important point that procedural 
rules for foreign exchange intervention under managed floating with inflation targeting are difficult to 
define, in contrast to clearly defined procedures for adjusting interest rates. To the extent that such 
rules exist, they are seldom revealed, complicating the analysis of motives for intervention. 
A.  Intervention to influence the level of the exchange rate 
In the early 1990s, many emerging market economies maintained (de facto or de jure) pegged or 
managed exchange rate regimes, which were intended to target the level of the exchange rate or limit 
fluctuations within a band. These arrangements were supported by monetary policy and exchange 
market intervention. In some cases, such as Hong Kong, Argentina, the Baltic states and Bulgaria, 
foreign exchange operations would support a peg under a currency board arrangement. Several 
economies in East Asia (eg Malaysia and Thailand) maintained basket pegs which closely resembled 
pegs to the dollar. Crawling (depreciating) bands were a feature of pegged exchange rates in Mexico 
and Indonesia before their respective crises in 1994 and 1997. However, exchange rate pressures 
could go in either direction: Chile, Israel and Singapore have experienced appreciation pressures 
within their bands over certain periods. Even countries with officially more flexible regimes limited 
exchange rate movements: under Korea’s “market average exchange rate system” adopted in 1990, 
daily exchange rate movements were limited within certain bands.
3 Many pegged exchange rate 
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arrangements collapsed after the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-98. However, there are important 
exceptions: pegs have been maintained in China and Hong Kong while Malaysia reverted to a fixed 
rate in 1998.  
Why does the official sector target the exchange rate? Three reasons may be cited. First, to control 
inflation or maintain internal balance. Some countries have controlled inflation by using the exchange 
rate as a nominal anchor for monetary policy. For example, the adoption of Argentina’s currency board 
and of Brazil’s quasi-fixed exchange rate regime in the early 1990s ended periods of very high inflation 
in these economies.
 The use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor has declined, but the issue 
remains important for China as it considers approaches to liberalising its exchange rate regime. Other 
countries (eg Chile, Israel and Singapore) have controlled inflation by using an exchange rate path 
(announced or unannounced) as an indirect or operational target to control inflation, or in support of 
monetary policy. The exchange rate was not necessarily the nominal anchor as these policies were 
implemented to support inflation targets. 
Second, to achieve external balance or enhance competitiveness and boost growth. Exchange rate 
targets have been used to prevent real exchange rate misalignment and achieve external equilibrium 
(eg in Korea until 1997). Often, a goal has been to prevent real exchange rate appreciation and large 
current account deficits that can be perceived as unsustainable and suddenly reverse.
4 As discussed 
below, others may have set exchange rates to enhance competitiveness. 
Third, to prevent crises. If there are significant currency mismatches in the economy so that foreign 
currency liabilities are not fully backed by foreign currency assets or earnings, a currency depreciation 
can adversely affect the financial position of financial institutions or firms that borrow in foreign 
currency. A sufficiently large depreciation could weaken the financial sector or even trigger a financial 
crisis under these conditions. 
A number of issues arise from these experiences.  
First, what roles should exchange rate intervention and interest rate adjustment play in implementing 
monetary and exchange rate policy? For a time, Israel relied exclusively on foreign exchange market 
intervention to maintain a pegged exchange rate. It then switched to an interest rate instrument to 
achieve an inflation target while relying on foreign exchange intervention to keep the exchange rate on 
target (however, it has not intervened since 1997). Hong Kong has resorted to unsterilised intervention 
in the foreign exchange market under its currency board-style arrangement (see Sokoler’s paper on 
Israel and Pang’s paper on Hong Kong in this volume, Gerlach et al (2004)). 
Second, what exchange rate level should be targeted? There are differing views on this. The 
traditional view is that the exchange rate level should be set so as to achieve external balance. 
However, exchange rate determination models are poor and criteria for judging external balance vary, 
so there can be disagreements on the extent to which the exchange rate might be misaligned.
5 Others 
use purchasing power parity (PPP) as the criterion for equilibrium, but estimates can also vary 
considerably. In some countries, deviations from PPP appear to persist for extended periods.
6 Still 
others argue that exchange rate policy should pursue development goals. In this view, some Asian 
countries have targeted the dollar and kept currencies undervalued in an effort to maintain external 
competitiveness, attract foreign direct investment and boost exports and growth (Dooley et al (2003, 
2004a)). The resulting accumulation of foreign reserves could be seen as collateral to attract foreign 
investors (Dooley et al (2004b)). From this perspective, low returns or even losses on such reserves 
would not necessarily be a concern given the growth and development benefits. In line with this, 
Graph  1 shows that real exchange rates for many emerging market economies do not show a 
                                                       
4  Current account deficits have recently turned to surpluses in a number of emerging market economies, but intervention to 
resist appreciation has continued in some cases. In other cases, questionnaire responses indicate that central banks 
monitor behaviour of the real exchange rate and the current account, even if they do not use these as criteria for 
intervention. 
5  In contrast, Goldstein (2004) argues that the balance of payments surplus in China reveals significant exchange rate 
misalignment and the need for a significant appreciation in the exchange rate. 
6  PPP estimates suggest that the nominal exchange rates are undervalued in a number of Asian economies. However, these 
estimates vary widely; in China they range from estimated undervaluation by a factor of 4 to undervaluation of 40%. Also, 
deviations from purchasing power parity in Asian economies appear to be more persistent than suggested by empirical 
studies indicating convergence to PPP in about four or five years (Frankel and Rose (1996)).  BIS Papers No 24  7
 
tendency towards appreciation in the medium run, which might have been expected given the rapid 
expansion in tradable goods capacity and, in many cases, significant balance of payments surpluses. 
Also, foreign reserves have risen very sharply as a result of heavy intervention in China and other 
emerging Asian economies. 
Graph 1 
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1  1985-99 = 100; in terms of relative consumer prices. An increase indicates an appreciation.   
2  In 
billions of US dollars.   
3  Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan (China) and Thailand.     
4    Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela.   
5  The  Czech Republic,  Hungary  and  Poland.   
6    Israel, South Africa and 
Turkey.   
7    For foreign exchange reserves, sum of the economies listed; for others, weighted 
average of the economies listed based on 2000 GDP and PPP exchange rates. 
Sources: IMF; national data; BIS calculations. 
For other emerging Asian economies, the gains from targeting the exchange rate no longer appear to 
be as clear-cut as suggested by Dooley et al. One reason is that the costs of preventing appreciation 
have risen. Inflation is higher in emerging markets that have intervened to stem currency appreciation, 
as are domestic interest rates, raising the carrying costs of holding foreign exchange reserves (see the 
discussion below and the contribution by Mohanty and Turner in this volume). Another reason is that 
while real exchange rates have depreciated in these economies the region has not preserved its lead 
in global exports or prevented the relocation of production to China. Thus, exports have fallen well 
below China’s, and are even below Latin America’s (where exchange rates appear to be much more 
flexible). Net FDI has also fallen off sharply, and recent research suggests that FDI to China displaces 
(in relative terms) FDI to other Asian economies (Chantasasawat et al (2004)).
7 It is worth highlighting 
that these developments are not all negative: they have been associated with the development of 
                                                       
7   The authors find that the level of Asia’s (excluding China) FDI is positively related to the level of FDI to China. However, the 
share of Asia FDI in global FDI is highly negatively correlated to FDI to China. More generally, growth and inflation benefits 
from pegs might accrue only to less developed countries that are not well integrated with global financial markets, not more 
advanced countries. For EMEs growth or disinflation gains from pegging appear to be nullified by vulnerability to crises, 
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production networks linking China and the rest of East Asia that appear to have enhanced the 
economic resilience of the region.  
Third, how far is the bilateral exchange rate (eg vis-à-vis the dollar) targeted rather than the effective 
exchange rate? The creation of the euro brought forth a large single currency trading area, but it is not 
clear to what extent this has been reflected in exchange rate targets or foreign reserve portfolios 
outside Europe. China’s and Japan’s role in Asian trade is also important. For example, the growing 
production networks between China and the rest of Asia suggest that these countries need to pay 
increasing attention to their exchange rates relative to each other’s currencies, rather than focusing 
exclusively on the US dollar. Also, the fact that Korea (for example) competes directly with Japan in 
third markets (including the Chinese market) can reasonably motivate assignment of a greater weight 
to won/yen fluctuations as opposed to won/dollar fluctuations. This will be particularly relevant during 
periods when the yen weakens against the dollar. 
Fourth, how should an exchange rate band be designed (slope and central tendency, width)? On the 
one hand, a tight band can dampen short-run volatility, which can be important in a very open 
economy, while allowing considerable adjustment in the long run. On the other hand, structural 
changes (eg lower exchange rate pass-through, greater vulnerability to interest rate shocks due to 
higher household indebtedness) might imply that more exchange rate volatility would be acceptable in 
order to smooth interest rate fluctuations. Singapore provides an example of these trade-offs: a tighter 
band is seen as giving less leeway to speculative accounts drawn to the relatively good liquidity of the 
Singapore dollar foreign exchange market, but recent structural changes prompted a private sector 
proposal calling for a permanent widening of the Singapore dollar exchange rate band. In Israel, 
intervention attracted persistent capital inflows that needed to be sterilised. A significant adjustment to 
the intervention band (which still exists) permitted the Bank of Israel to stop intervening in June 1997, 
alleviating losses it had experienced from intervention (see Sokoler’s contribution to this volume). 
Fifth, what is the appropriate degree of transparency in an exchange rate target? On the one hand, 
transparency can help coordinate expectations and improve market efficiency. On the other hand, 
information about specific targets can trigger speculation. For example, Israel for a time targeted a 
publicly disclosed midpoint of a crawling band, but this led to speculative pressure, prompting the 
central bank to cease intervening as long as the exchange rate remained within the band. Hungary 
stopped disclosing its band (narrower than the ±15% allowed under the criteria for entry into the euro 
zone) because policymakers feared that markets would attack it. Singapore provides qualitative 
information on its band, but it does not disclose the precise width so as to deter speculative attacks. 
Similar considerations have prompted Hong Kong to maintain an asymmetric exchange rate target. 
There is a floor at 7.80 at which point the convertibility undertaking is triggered. However, there is no 
explicit target to limit currency appreciation. As noted by Pang in this volume, this makes it difficult for 
speculators to calculate the cost of shorting the Hong Kong dollar. For further discussion of tactical 
issues of intervention, see Archer’s contribution to this volume.  
The answers to the preceding questions may depend in part on the roles of the ministry of finance (or 
other government authorities) in exchange rate policy and intervention, and the extent do which their 
objectives differ from those of the central bank. In some countries, the ministry of finance would favour 
intervention to preserve competitiveness while the central bank would be more concerned with 
intervening in a way consistent with achieving its inflation goals. Disagreements of this kind appear to 
have had a significant impact on intervention in some cases; the extent may depend on arrangements 
discussed in more detail in Moser-Boehm’s paper in this volume. 
B.  Intervention under floating 
1. Higher  exchange rate volatility 
Since the collapse of pegged exchange rate regimes in the second half of the 1990s, many countries 
have switched to floating exchange rates with inflation targeting. Graph 2 reveals that high volatility 
during crisis episodes in the 1990s makes it hard to tell whether volatility has risen in recent years. 
However, a close examination of Graph 2 suggests that exchange rate volatility (against the US dollar) 
in emerging Asia (excluding China and India) and Latin America increased significantly in this decade, 
compared to periods of exchange rate stability in the 1990s (1995-96 in Asia, and 1996-98 in Latin 
America). Volatility has recently risen somewhat in India. Turning to the second panel, exchange rate 
volatility (against the euro) has remained roughly stable in central Europe, but has increased 
significantly since 2000 in other emerging markets. BIS Papers No 24  9
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1  Calculated as the 60-day rolling standard deviation of daily percentage changes in the exchange rate, 
where exchange rate is defined as the local currency against the euro for central Europe and against the 
US dollar for others.     
2    Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan (China) and Thailand.   
3  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.   
4  The 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.   
5  Israel, South Africa and Turkey.   
6  Weighted average of the 
economies listed based on 2000 GDP and PPP exchange rates. 
Sources: Datastream; ECB; BIS calculations. 
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1  Estimated with Epanechnikov kernel using a bandwidth of 0.0483. 2004 estimates based on data up 
to end of October. 
Source: BIS calculations. 
Changes in volatility are revealed more clearly by shifts in the estimated densities of rolling daily 
standard deviations during years of relative tranquillity. To illustrate, in Graph 3, the left-hand panel 
shows that, for the baht/dollar exchange rate, the short-run average volatility that is apparently 
tolerated by the Thai authorities has increased considerably since 1996; the mass of the distribution 
has shifted to the right and there is also more mass at higher volatilities (the right tail of the density). 
On the other hand, there is a striking similarity in the estimated densities in recent years. The right-
hand panel of Graph 3 reveals that in 2004 the estimated density for the Thai baht was still to the left 
of the Korean won’s. The Brazilian real has been subject to much more volatility than either of these 10  BIS Papers No 24
 
two currencies: the density over the interval shown appears to be much flatter and the incidence of 
higher volatility is also greater. It may be noted that, in contrast, exchange rate volatility has actually 
fallen in recent years in some countries that have not actively intervened (Mexico and Israel), 
suggesting the presence of stabilising speculation. 
Greater tolerance for exchange rate volatility is reflected in an apparent decline in intervention in 
foreign exchange markets in recent years (see Mihaljek’s paper in this volume). One reason is that 
some economies are now more resilient to exchange rate fluctuations. Improved macroeconomic 
policies and policy credibility have reduced the short-term pass-through of exchange rate changes to 
inflation. At the same time, currency mismatches have declined (see Andersen and Moreno (2005), 
Graph 2), reducing the extent to which currency depreciation could weaken the financial sector and 
result in sharp contractions in output.  
A second reason is that floating has advantages: it can prevent exchange rate overvaluation, and may 
help stabilise capital flows (see eg the papers in this volume by Özatay on Turkey and De Gregorio 
and Tokman on Chile, and Cifuentes and Desormeaux (2005)).  
A third reason is that intervention can impose significant costs and may also have become less 
effective.
8 For example, foreign exchange market participants in one emerging market argued that 
tight limits on bank position-taking, the absence of speculators and regular intervention (once or twice 
a week, occasionally on both sides of the market within a week) reduced the scope for stabilising 
speculation and stunted market growth. It is also thought that very large foreign exchange market 
intervention designed to maximise the impact on the foreign exchange market has in some cases 
deterred private sector participation and impaired price discovery. The costs of these distortions tend 
to be higher in countries where financial markets are more developed. Intervention also tends to be 
less effective in more developed financial markets, where the substitutability of domestic and foreign 
assets is higher. This might explain why foreign exchange market intervention is now comparatively 
rare in developed countries other than Japan.  
2.  Intervention goals under floating 
Although reliance on intervention appears to have declined under floating, policymakers are not 
entirely indifferent to exchange rate volatility. Questionnaire responses for the 2003 and 2004 
Emerging Market Deputy Governors meetings indicate that intervention can at times recur over 
extended periods (weeks) and involve significant amounts. Under floating, intervention in part reflects 
the desire to preserve macroeconomic or financial stability (Table 1). For example, in 2002 sharp 
currency depreciation in Brazil was followed by a rise in inflation which required raising the inflation 
target. The central bank intervened and also raised interest rates. Emerging foreign exchange markets 
are also more prone to one-sided bets and instability, because they are thin and subject to a high 
degree of uncertainty and information asymmetries. Countries with high debts, currency mismatches 
or fragile financial sectors are particularly vulnerable.
9 In line with this, many countries cite lack of 
depth in the foreign exchange market as an important factor behind intervention. In principle, 
misalignment and external balance should be less of a concern under floating, but, as discussed 
below, in practice it appears to be an important reason for intervention. 
Given these concerns, what do central banks target when deciding to intervene? Questionnaire 
responses and discussion at the meeting suggest that there is no single target under floating 
exchange rates. The immediate goals of intervention can include: (a) dampening volatility 
symmetrically; (b) countering excessive exchange rate movements or overshooting; (c) reducing the 
rate of change in the exchange rate (“leaning against the wind”); and (d) supplying liquidity to the 
market. In cases where the threat of disorderly markets is more immediate, concern about exchange 
rate movements becomes secondary and the primary goal is to supply liquidity to ensure the market 
keeps functioning. Some examples follow.  
                                                       
8   Other costs of intervention are cited by Mohanty and Turner’s contribution to this volume. 
9   In contrast, in developed countries a main concern has been the potentially adverse effects of exchange rate volatility on 
international trade. The effects may be apparent only in the medium term and research has generally found these to be 
small. There are a number of reasons for this intervention, including to prevent sharp movements in tradable goods prices 
and resource misallocation that might arise.  BIS Papers No 24  11
 
(a)  Dampening volatility symmetrically 
On average, about 48% of respondents cited dampening exchange rate volatility as having been one 
of the immediate objectives of foreign exchange market intervention since the beginning of the 
decade. Views differ on conditions under which volatility should be a concern. One view is that 
policymakers should not dampen short-run volatility in foreign exchange markets, in order to 
encourage risk management and financial market development. In contrast, it is desirable to dampen 
volatility at longer horizons. For example, the Czech National Bank does not intervene in response to 
short-run daily exchange rate volatility, as measured by rolling standard deviations over a 60-day 
period. On the other hand, Bank Indonesia has intervened during periods when rupiah volatility has 
exceeded average annual volatility. Bank Indonesia considers the intervention effective if volatility falls 
(see Holub’s and Bank Indonesia’s respective contributions to this volume). In some situations, short-
run volatility might be seen as potentially destabilising and might nevertheless trigger a response (see 
discussion of liquidity below).  
(b)  Preventing excessive exchange rate movements or overshooting 
While expressing concerns about volatility, questionnaire respondents also indicated that they 
intervene to influence the level of the exchange rate. Over the period 2000-04, 28% of 
(22) respondents said they intervened for this reason. One explanation is that central banks seeking to 
dampen volatility will in many cases not respond to direct measures of volatility such as rolling 
standard deviations, but might intervene in response to “excessive” exchange rate movements 
instead. Such movements might be considered excessive because they reflect persistent deviations 
from equilibrium, or misalignment. In line with this, the Czech National Bank defines long-run volatility 
in terms of extreme fluctuations around a long-run trend. In 2004, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
introduced a similar criterion as the basis for possible intervention. Alternatively exchange rate 
movements might be considered excessive because of their impact on inflation or on financial 
stability.
10 For example, Mexico intervened in response to very large peso depreciation in September 
1998 caused by the Russian crisis and the near collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, a US 
fund. Chile responded to large depreciations on two recent occasions (August to December 2001 and 
October 2002 to February 2003) by preannouncing total (but not daily) sterilised intervention amounts 
over each period and the form of intervention.
11 Colombia’s volatility options are another example, as 
one of the goals of this mechanism is to avoid excessive movements in the exchange rate, in order to 
support achieving the inflation target. The concern with excessive exchange rate movements applies 
to large developed regions as well; in 2000 the European Central Bank intervened when exchange 
rate movements were thought to pose risks for price stability.  
Other forms of foreign exchange market operations can also limit excessive exchange rate 
movements. South Africa has taken advantage of periods when there is a large influx of foreign 
currency liquidity in the market (eg due to large export receipts or investment transactions) to 
purchase foreign currency in order to build reserves; the effect would be to dampen possible spikes in 
the exchange rate. In some cases, central banks have engaged in passive intervention to prevent the 
foreign currency from reaching the market, eg when there are large revenues from foreign direct 
investment or from commodity exports. For example, the Mexican oil company Pemex can only 
acquire pesos by depositing its dollars in the central bank; it typically does this when it needs to meet 
its tax obligations. A similar mechanism to channel foreign currency privatisation revenues away from 
the foreign exchange market by depositing them in the central bank was set up in the Czech Republic 
(Sidaoui (2005) describes the case of Mexico, Holub in this volume the case of the Czech Republic, 
and Mihaljek (2005) provides a more general discussion).
12 
                                                       
10   The distinction is made for purposes of clarity. However, it is not entirely straightforward, because central banks have 
multiple objectives and might also be concerned with external balance when trying to dampen excessive movements in the 
exchange rate. It is not always possible to tell what their real motivation is.  
11   The effect of sterilised intervention appeared to be small, but the effect of the announcement was large. 
12   One implication is that the transactions of the petroleum revenue stabilisation fund are entirely in local currency, so it poses 
no issues for foreign exchange market intervention. On the other hand, the oil stabilisation fund in Venezuela is maintained 
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One participant suggested that central banks might cite volatility as their intervention goal when they 
are in fact concerned with deviations from equilibrium or the magnitude and direction of exchange rate 
movements. However, another participant stressed the importance of reassuring markets that the 
exchange rate level was not being targeted. Other participants said that volatility is worth monitoring 
separately for signs of disorderly markets, even when attention is paid to the exchange rate level.  
(c)  Leaning against the wind 
Policymakers are typically concerned not just with how much the exchange rate might deviate from 
equilibrium but with how quickly it does so. Intervention will often attempt to slow the rate of change in 
the exchange rate without preventing trend changes, a policy that is known as “leaning against the 
wind”. While intervention of this kind typically occurs when the exchange rate is moving away from 
equilibrium, it can sometimes occur if the exchange rate is moving back to equilibrium, but “too 
quickly”. Slowing the rate of change in the exchange rate can stop herding behaviour by acting as a 
circuit breaker. By reducing uncertainty, this type of intervention may facilitate foreign exchange 
market development and enhances the availability of hedging instruments (eg for agents in the 
tradable goods sector). On the other hand, by acting as a provider of “insurance” against rapid 
exchange rate movements, official intervention could also undermine incentives for the development of 
hedging capability in the private sector. As reported by participants at this meeting, this has been the 
experience of Chile, Israel and Mexico.  
On average over the last five years, 19% of respondents to the questionnaire indicated that they 
practice “leaning against the wind”. For example, “volatility” options used by the central bank of 
Colombia are also designed to moderate excessive and abrupt movements in the exchange rate from 
its recent trend that could lead to changes in expectations that drive the exchange rate away from its 
fundamentals (see Uribe’s paper in this volume and Uribe (2005)). Leaning against the wind is 
described as the main focus of intervention in Peru, and was used to calm markets and dampen 
volatility during a period of exchange rate pressure in 2002 (reflecting investor risk aversion and 
political uncertainty in Brazil). More recently, intervention has been used to smooth appreciation 
pressures (see Armas’s paper in this volume). 
(d)  Supplying liquidity (or serving as market-maker of last resort) 
Episodes of financial stress can trigger intervention. On average, 21% of the respondents to the 
questionnaire indicated that they intervened in response to extreme events, while 55% said they 
intervened to curb excessive exchange market speculation. During such periods, liquidity can collapse 
among market-makers, with severely impaired price discovery and problems in getting private 
transactions executed. Maintaining convertibility is the prime objective of this type of intervention, 
which is consistent with preserving financial stability and preventing crises. Intervention might also 
have the desirable effect of limiting the extent of overshooting that might result from the disappearance 
of liquidity by restoring effective price discovery, although this is not the main objective.
13 Among the 
respondents to the questionnaire, 41% indicated that they had intervened to provide liquidity in thin 
foreign exchange markets. For example, Brazil and Korea have intervened during periods of foreign 
exchange market volatility triggered by political uncertainty to supply liquidity to foreign exchange 
markets and fill gaps between bids and offers in this market (see eg Rhee’s paper on Korea in this 
volume). In Brazil, intervention was accompanied by the issuance of foreign currency-linked debt as a 
hedging instrument. The effect was the continued operation of the foreign exchange market under 
conditions in which it otherwise might have collapsed. 
C.  Influencing the amount of foreign reserves 
Another motive for central bank operations in the foreign exchange market is to influence the level of 
foreign exchange reserves. Many central banks have sought to accumulate reserves, a policy more or 
less continuously followed by a number of Asian economies since the crises of the late 1990s and 
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more recently by a number of Latin American central banks. Others have sought to reduce the growth 
in or the level of reserves (Mexico and Chile). Three broad considerations may guide the criteria and 
choice of instruments for, and tactics used in, regulating the amount of reserves: (a) exchange rate 
impact; (b) market friendliness; and (c) costs versus benefits. 
(a)  Exchange rate impact 
While the goal of other types of central bank participation in the foreign exchange market cited above 
is to maximise the impact on the exchange rate, the goal when seeking to influence the amount of 
reserves is to minimise this impact. There is keen awareness of this issue in a number of emerging 
market central banks. For example, both Mexico and Colombia have used options mechanisms for 
regulating the amount of foreign reserves to ensure that the central bank does not accumulate 
reserves when the domestic currency is under depreciation pressure (see Sidaoui (2005) and Uribe 
(2005) for descriptions). Mexico’s use of a preannounced formula to limit the growth in foreign 
reserves and the policy of spreading out foreign currency sales on a daily basis over a period of time 
would also tend to minimise the exchange rate impact. Turkey has used preannounced, rule-based 
foreign exchange purchase auctions to accumulate foreign reserves. South Africa’s policy of 
“creaming off” uses another approach to limit the exchange rate impact, as reserves are accumulated 
during periods when the market is flush with foreign liquidity (see Özatay’s paper on Turkey and the 
paper contributed by South Africa for this volume). 
(b) Market  friendliness 
This is important because government policies can impair foreign exchange market development and 
price discovery. One issue is the size of the central bank presence in the foreign exchange market, 
which as suggested earlier can discourage private sector participation. By this criterion, policies that 
minimise the exchange rate impact of central bank operations to influence reserves would tend to be 
market friendly. Another issue is the use of supplementary measures, such as foreign exchange 
controls, to ensure foreign reserves are channelled to the central bank. This is an issue in emerging 
market economies that impose foreign exchange surrender requirements.  
(c)  Costs and benefits 
A primary consideration in any decision affecting the level of reserves is the marginal costs of an 
additional dollar of reserves against the marginal benefits, an issue that has been explored by a 
number of central banks (eg Chile and Mexico).
14 For example, if the impact on competitiveness is not 
a consideration, the marginal benefit of an additional dollar in foreign reserves could be estimated as 
the expected reduction in the cost of a currency crisis based on early warning system estimates (ie the 
change in the probability of a crisis associated with an increase in reserves times the cost of a crisis) 
while the marginal cost is the opportunity cost of holding reserves (eg the sovereign spread - which 
assumes reserves are financed by foreign borrowing - times the change in reserves). 
Assessing marginal benefits in this way is a step beyond traditional measures of reserve adequacy 
which are based on rules of thumb, of which there are now many. For example, De Beaufort Wijnholds 
and Kapteyn (1999) suggest that the traditional benchmark, reserves to imports, is obsolete and the 
emphasis should be on coverage for possible flight from the banking system (reserves to M2), or to 
the possibility that short-term external financing will dry up (reserves to short-term debt, also known as 
the Guidotti rule). Reserve holdings are presented in terms of these three benchmarks in Table 2. 
                                                       
14   See Sidaoui (2005). Some of the discussion also drawns on points made by Esteban Jadresic of the Central bank of Chile 
at a central bank workshop in Brasilia in 2004. 14  BIS Papers No 24
 
Table 2 
Foreign exchange reserves and measures of adequacy 
Foreign exchange reserves: 








1994 2003 1994 2003 1994 2003 1994 2003 
Asia, large economies
3  188    862    57   109    12    19   215    687 
China   52   403  45   98    9    15    267  1,300 
India   19    98  72    139    13    25    257   598 
Korea   25   155  24   86    7    21   60   289 
Taiwan,  China    92    207   108   161    20    33   485    835 
Other Asia
3   71   132  43   59    25    32    113   294 
Indonesia   12    35  37    105    15    31   54   258 
Malaysia   25    43  42   54    40    39    355   416 
Philippines   6  13    28   36   18    30    179   121 
Thailand   29    41  53   55    26    29   92   404 
Latin America
3   92   171  54   60    20    29   85   137 
Argentina   14    13  64   95    26    34   63    55 
Brazil    37    49   112   102    24    35   128    124 
Chile    13  15    120   86   78    46    197   138 
Colombia   8  10    65   73   51    44    151   277 
Mexico   6  58   8   34   3    18    16   157 
Peru    7    10  125   119    77    54   304    164 
Venezuela   7  16    83   156   50    82    172   493 
Central Europe
3   19    73  38   48    24    37    271   240 
Czech  Republic   6  27    36   53   22    40    304   473 
Hungary   7  12    46   25   35    29    202  98 
Poland   6  34    34   64   19    38    367   274 
Israel   7  26    29   75   12    22    358   438 
Russia   4  73   8   97   14    67    22   284 
South  Africa   2   6   8   18   3    6    19  63 
Turkey    7    34  31   49    22    32   80   148 
All countries above
3    391 1,377    47   83   15    23    129   354 
Memo:          
Australia   11    30    20    34    6    7    21    24 
Japan   115    653    42    170    2    10     235 
Sweden   23    18    43    22    24    12     15 
1  In billions of US dollars.   
2  Short-term external debt defined as short-term liabilities to BIS reporting banks: consolidated 
cross-border claims of all BIS reporting banks on countries outside the reporting area with a maturity up to and including one 
year plus international debt securities outstanding with a maturity up to one year.   
3  Sum or average of the countries shown. 
Sources: IMF; national data; BIS. 
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As for costs, they depend in part on the level of reserves and how intervention is financed. Research 
suggests that higher foreign reserves can reduce sovereign spreads as well as improve credit ratings 
(Moreno and Turner (2004)). Thus the costs of holding reserves can narrow through this channel as 
reserves rise. At the same time, whether foreign reserves are financed by money creation, by the 
issuance of central bank instruments, by the sale of government securities or by foreign borrowing has 
different implications for currency and duration exposures, the profitability of the central bank and 
overall costs. The choice of financing also influences who bears the cost: the public at large through 
inflation or taxation or the central bank. Except in countries with pegged exchange rates, policymakers 
cannot generally finance foreign reserve accumulation through money creation without undermining 
domestic policy objectives (ie the importance of sterilising intervention is widely recognised). Some 
countries resort to foreign currency financing of foreign reserve purchases, in part to limit the direct 
impact of reserve accumulation on the central bank income statement. Others rely on financing of 
foreign reserve purchases through the sale of treasury securities or the issuance of central bank 
securities. This can raise the cost of financing recorded in central bank statements, but reduce the net 
external indebtedness position of the government and overall currency mismatches in the economy. 
Some of the implications of intervention are discussed by Mohanty and Turner’s paper in this volume.  
There are no available cross-country studies comparing marginal costs to marginal benefits of foreign 
reserve accumulation. However, recent measures to reduce foreign reserve holdings and to limit 
foreign reserve growth suggest that in some Latin American countries (Chile, Mexico) the costs of 
holding additional foreign reserves exceed the benefits. In contrast, a number of Asian countries with 
much higher foreign reserve levels do not appear to consider a reduction in reserve holdings a 
priority.
15 The reasons for the contrasting reserve levels also warrant further research. Possible 
explanations include relatively low interest rates in Asia (which reduce marginal costs of reserve 
acquisition); foreign reserve accumulation as a by-product of other policies, such as a desire to 
influence the exchange rate in order to preserve competitiveness; and political economy 
considerations. These last issues may arise when large-scale foreign exchange reserves appear as a 
highly visible and apparently freely available resource for politicians to spend on public works. Some 
recent research suggests that it is optimal to hold lower foreign reserves if the government is more 
inclined to spend them (Aizenman and Marion (2004)). 
III. Conclusion 
Central banks intervene in foreign exchange markets to achieve a variety of maroeconomic objectives, 
such as controlling inflation, maintaining competitiveness or maintaining financial stability. However, 
the specific motives for intervention are likely to change with their level of economic and financial 
development. Central banks in countries at earlier stages of development often intervene to support a 
pegged exchange rate, and are also more likely to function as “market makers”, supplying liquidity in 
less developed foreign exchange markets. More advanced emerging markets have generally adopted 
flexible exchange rates and intervention is more likely to focus on dampening exchange rate volatility. 
Central banks thus enter the foreign exchange market to prevent overshooting or slow the speed of 
adjustment in the exchange rate, and to supply liquidity during periods of financial stress. Central 
banks also enter the foreign exchange market to regulate the amount of foreign exchange reserves, 
either to accumulate the hard currency needed for intervention, or to reduce reserves in order to lower 
carrying costs. 
                                                       
15  This is the case even if foreign reserves in Asian economies already exceeded a popular liquidity benchmark (the Guidotti 
rule) by 1999. The IMF (2003) finds that reserve holdings in Asia exceeded those predicted by a set of determinants of 
demand for reserve holdings. 16  BIS Papers No 24
 
Annex 
Two definitions of intervention: narrow versus broad 
There are two views on how foreign exchange market intervention should be defined. One is that the 
definition should be narrow: central bank transactions in the foreign exchange market should be called 
“intervention” only if (1) they are sterilised, ie are offset by central bank transactions that nullify any 
impact on domestic money creation (unsterilised intervention would then be considered monetary 
policy); (2) the purpose is to influence the exchange rate.
16 Sterilised intervention would be viewed as 
distinct from monetary policy, and multiple goals that could otherwise be in conflict can be achieved.  
Excluding central bank operations that are not intended to influence the exchange rate can rule out a 
number of transactions that might have no underlying stabilisation policy goal, such as small technical 
transactions, foreign reserve purchases financed by foreign currency borrowing, or transactions that 
are similar to those of other economic agents and are related to underlying economic activities 
(eg using foreign reserves to purchase a piece of equipment on behalf of the government). In some 
cases central banks do not consider as intervention transactions that are mainly intended to regulate 
the amount of foreign reserves, particularly if they are automatic or based on rules, rather than 
discretionary. For example, Mexico’s operations to limit the growth in reserves by selling foreign 
currency according to a predetermined formula are arguably not intervention as narrowly defined. 
However, focusing exclusively on a narrow definition of intervention can lead one to overlook important 
policy issues, particularly in emerging market economies. First, central bank operations in emerging 
foreign exchange markets are often not (immediately) sterilised or the instrument used in sterilisation 
might be of short duration.
17 Indeed, many central banks have relied on operations in the foreign 
exchange market as a way to implement monetary policy, which would imply not sterilising at all. Even 
when the exchange rate is floating, central banks sometimes prefer to intervene in the foreign 
exchange market rather than conduct an open market operation to achieve a monetary policy 
objective.
18 Understanding the motives for and characteristics of central bank operations in the foreign 
exchange market under these conditions is of considerable policy interest, whether the operation is 
labelled intervention or not. 
Second, central bank foreign exchange transactions can affect the exchange rate even if this is not the 
primary intention. For example, in pursuing its policy of reserve accumulation, the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) tries to limit the impact on the exchange rate by entering the market only when 
large supplies of foreign currency become available. It is also “quiet”: it does not announce its 
transactions in real time (they can be inferred ex post, from the central bank balance sheet), and will 
typically not initiate large transactions but will wait for holders of foreign currency to offer it to the 
SARB. However, the transactions are large, so it is likely that the impact on the exchange rate is 
significant, even if this is not the primary purpose (see discussion in this paper). Reserve accumulation 
can also affect the exchange rate because of its impact on sovereign ratings and spreads (Moreno 
and Turner (2004)). Mihaljek’s paper in this volume reports that a significant number of central banks 
find some positive impact of reserve accumulation on sovereign credit ratings.  
Some therefore favour a broad definition of foreign exchange market intervention. A widely cited 
central bank working group report acknowledges that intervention is usually undertaken to influence 
the exchange rate, but defines it as “any sale or purchase of foreign exchange against domestic 
currency which monetary authorities undertake in the exchange market” (Jurgensen (1983)). This 
                                                       
16  On the other hand, one participant whose currency is pegged argued that day-to-day operations in which the central bank 
supplies foreign exchange or accumulates foreign reserves should not be considered intervention. The term intervention 
should in this view be reserved for exceptional cases.  
17   For a general discussion of sterilised intervention and its limits, see Mohanty and Turner’s paper in this volume. 
18  The reasons underlying the choice between the foreign exchange market and the domestic money market to implement 
policy warrant further investigation, but it is apparent that the foreign exchange market will be preferred when the benefits 
exceed the costs. For example, one participant noted that during an episode of sharp depreciation that threatened the 
inflation target by influencing inflation expectations, a very sharp rise in interest rates would have been required to stabilise 
the exchange rate. Intervention in the foreign exchange market was seen as preferable under these conditions. BIS Papers No 24  17
 
applies to intervention in spot or forward markets, regardless of the form of financing (reserves, swaps, 
borrowing, etc).  
An even broader definition includes “passive” interventions. Here the central bank takes foreign 
currency directly from public or private entities outside the market, in some cases as a result of 
surrender requirements. A traditional reason for such intervention is that the government wishes to 
control the allocation of foreign reserves. Another reason is to insulate the foreign exchange market 
from the impact of very large foreign exchange flows (ie to dampen exchange rate volatility).
19 Some 
emerging market examples are discussed in this paper. Adams and Henderson (1983, page 3) argue 
that “such direct dealings of central banks, sometimes called ‘passive’ intervention, are actually as 
active as an effort to affect the ultimate relative supplies of securities denominated in different 
currencies as conventional operations are; they should therefore be included in a comprehensive 
intervention measure”. One implication of adopting a broad definition is that changes in foreign 
reserves (adjusting for exchange rate valuation effects) can be interpreted as closely reflecting 
intervention. 
To sum up, there are pros and cons to adopting either the narrow or broad definition of foreign 
exchange market intervention. In practice, each central bank adopts the definition that it considers 
most appropriate for its purposes. The discussion in this volume therefore extends beyond the narrow 
definition of foreign exchange market intervention to include a range of central bank operations in the 
foreign exchange market. 
                                                       
19   There are still other measures governments adopt outside the foreign exchange market that can influence the exchange 
rate. For example, during periods of exchange market pressure, the Brazilian government has issued domestic currency 
debt linked to the exchange rate that has been used as a hedging instrument. However, this does not directly involve a sale 
or purchase of foreign exchange. 18  BIS Papers No 24
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